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Understanding the Impact of Brand Delistings on Assortment Evaluations and Store 
Switching and Complaining Intentions  
 
Abstract 
Recently, retailers have begun considering which brands they can delist without reducing customer 
satisfaction, losing category sales, or increasing store switching behavior. Although several studies have 
considered assortment reductions, none has explicitly investigated the impact of total brand delistings. 
Therefore, the authors study the impact of brand delistings on assortment evaluations and store switching 
and complaining intentions. They execute both a controlled experiment and a survey and find that brand 
delisting mainly has negative consequences when the delisted brands have high equity, assortment size is 
limited, the assortment consists of a low proportion of high-equity brands, and the brand delistings take 
place in categories with high hedonic levels. The authors discuss the theoretical and managerial 
implications of these findings. 
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Since the publication of the Efficient Consumer Response report (Kurt Salmon Associates 1993) 
the topic of assortment efficiency has received considerable attention from practitioners in the fields of 
retailing and manufacturing, as well as from marketing academics (Broniarczyk, Hoyer, and McAlister 1998; 
Food Marketing Institute 1993; Kumar 2004). The traditional perspective asserted that retailers could 
improve assortment attractiveness and customer retention by extending their assortments (e.g., Borle et al. 
2003; Hoch, Bradlow, and Wansink 1999; Oppewal and Koelemeijer 2005). However, recent studies have 
shown that large assortments do not necessarily lead to greater perceived variety or higher assortment 
evaluations. For example, Van Herpen and Pieters (2002) find that assortment size may not be a good 
proxy for perceived assortment variety, and Iyengar and Lepper (2000) similarly show that extensive 
assortments may undermine consumers’ satisfaction. In an assortment reduction–based context, 
Broniarczyk, Hoyer, and McAlister (1998) show that delisting less preferred items while maintaining 
constant category space does not harm assortment evaluations.  
In contrast with widely held beliefs, some studies have provided examples of assortment 
reductions that resulted in an increase of category sales (Drèze, Hoch, and Purk 1994; Food Marketing 
Institute 1993). Boatwright and Nunes (2001) find that small cuts in an assortment may increase category 
sales, whereas greater cuts engender category sale declines. That retailers carrying limited assortments 
can be very successful has been proven in practice by discount retailers, such as Aldi, Lidl, and Trader Joe, 
that have become fierce competitors of service retailers in many markets. Finally, on the basis of thorough 
analyses of the success of hard discounters in Germany, consulting agency McKinsey claims that limited 
assortments not only facilitate efficient shopping but also emphasize a low price image (Distrifood, 2004a).  
A specific type of assortment reduction is brand delisting. Whereas assortment reductions usually 
pertain to the delistings of multiple items of different brands, a brand delisting refers the total delisting of a 
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single brand (no items of that brand are sold anymore) in a category. Brand delisting is a very relevant topic 
is today’s retailing practices for several reasons. First, some retailers (e.g., Wal-Mart, Home Depot, the 
Gap) are now considered strong brands themselves and have developed successful store brands (Ailawadi 
and Harlam 2004; Henderson and Mihas 2000; Steenkamp and Dekimpe 1997). These retailers’ 
assortment, in addition to other factors such as their price and service level, represents an important point 
of differentiation. For example, the Dutch food retailer Edah delisted hundreds of national brands because it 
wanted to create more shelf space for its profitable, distinctive store brand (Distrifood 2004a). Second, 
since the mid-1990s, many service retailers have adopted a category management model (Dhar, Hoch, and 
Kumar 2001) that assigns specific category roles to each product category, which has had various 
implications for the offered assortment (ECR Europe 1998). For example, a retailer may decide to lower the 
number of premium brands it offers in a product category because it has changed the category role from a 
destination to a routine (Dhar, Hoch, and Kumar 2001). Third, retailers can exert buying power over 
suppliers by threatening to delist brands if buying conditions are not improved (Bloom and Perry 2001) or 
delist brands to punish a certain supplier. Although some moral issues surround this topic, retail boycotts of 
individual brands are no longer exceptions. For example, the U.K. retailer ASDA refused to stock the 
Proctor&Gamble brand Charmin (Marketing Week 2000), and the German retailers Edeka and Metro 
delisted some national brands because they were unsatisfied with the pricing and distribution policy of 
those manufacturers (Distrifood 2004b). 
Prior research on assortment reductions mainly has considered the effect of item deletions on 
category and/or store sales using natural experiments in which a considerable percentage of items in a 
category was delisted (e.g., Boatwright and Nunes 2001; Borle et al. 2003; Broniarczyk, Hoyer, and 
McAlister 1998; Drèze, Hoch, and Purk 1994; Food Marketing Institute 1993). In contrast with the focus of 
current studies on the consequences of item delistings, we investigate brand delistings, which we define  as 
permanent deletions of all items of a brand from the assortment of a retailer. By including “permanent” in 
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our definition, we imply that store employees are not able to order a particular brand for a longer period of 
time because the retailer does not list the brand anymore.  
The objectives of this research are twofold. First, we want to quantify consumer responses to brand 
delistings; second, we want to investigate the antecedents that moderate this response. In Study 1, we 
conduct a controlled experiment in which we vary the assortment size and structure. We then measure the 
effect of assortment variation on assortment evaluation (AE) and store switching intentions (SSI) in 
situations in which consumers’ primary brand is delisted. In the second study, we conduct a survey in a 
natural environment by which we measure the effect of a hypothetical brand delisting on SSI and 
complaining intentions (CI). Because we conducted Study 2 in 16 supermarkets for 10 different product 
categories, we are able to generalize our results and test several objective brand-, product category–, 
retailer assortment–, and store-related antecedents for consumer responses to a brand delisting.  
The rest of this article is organized as follows: We first review prior literature on assortment 
reductions. We then continue by presenting the hypotheses, the research methodology, and the empirical 
results of Study 1. Subsequently, we present Study 2 with its underlying hypotheses, the applied research 
methodology, and the results of our data analysis. We end with a discussion of the theoretical and 
managerial implications of our study, as well as its research limitations.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A broad stream of experimental research addresses assortment size, variety, composition, and 
evaluation (Hoch, Bradlow, and Wansink 1999; Kahn and Lehmann 1991; Kahn and Wansink 2004; 
Oppewal and Koelemeijer 2005; Van Herpen and Pieters 2002). These studies, in which respondents are 
confronted with hypothetical assortments, generally indicate that large assortments with more variety are 
better. However, some recent studies have pointed to the negative effects of providing extensive choice in 
assortments (e.g., Iyengar and Lepper 2000). Related to this research stream are studies on the effect of 
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an assortment reduction, in which consumers are confronted with a delisting of one or more items that 
previously were part of the assortment known to the consumer. Most assortment reduction studies are 
based on field experiments and focus on the relationship between item delistings and category sales 
(Boatwright and Nunes 2001; De Clerck et al. 2001; Drèze, Hoch, and Purk 1994; Food Marketing Institute 
1993), though some also study the impact of item delistings on store sales (Borle et al. 2004). Because of 
the differences in the depth of the assortment cuts studied in natural experiments (i.e., the percentage of 
items in a category), it is not surprising that different results regarding the cuts’ effect on category sales 
have been found. For example, whereas De Clerck and colleagues (2001) review minor deletions from a 
wide variety of product categories of a grocery retailer and conclude that category sales were not affected 
in most categories, Drèze, Hoch, and Purk (1994) conduct a natural experiment and, among other 
assortment changes, cut the assortment of a few product categories by as much as 10% of the poorly 
selling items. They report an average category sales increase of 3.9%. The FMI (1993) conducts natural 
experiments in six categories, examines reductions of varying size (from “limited” to “extended”), and 
concludes that small cuts can lead to (small) category sales increases, whereas extended cuts may result 
in small category sales losses. Boatwright and Nunes (2001) consider the effect of major assortment cuts in 
most categories of an online grocer. In line with previous research, they conclude that eliminating brands 
and flavors to a small degree helps sales but that deep cuts decrease sales.  
Some of the results found in the natural experiments have been confirmed by controlled 
experiments. Broniarczyk, Hoyer, and McAlister (1998) conduct two controlled experiments to measure the 
effect of item reductions on assortment perceptions and store choice. They show that retailers may be able 
to make substantive reductions in the number of items they carry without negatively affecting customers’ 
assortment perceptions and store choice, as long as only low-preference items are eliminated and category 
space is held constant. However, related research on assortment variety (number of items) and attraction 
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(e.g., Kahn and Wansink 2004; Van Ketel, van Bruggen, and Smidts 2003) shows that more variety 
improves assortment perceptions, though this effect diminishes if the actual assortments become larger.  
The literature on out-of-stocks is closely related to studies of assortment reductions. An out-of-
stock situation differs from an assortment reduction in several aspects but primarily in that an out-of-stock is 
temporary, whereas an assortment reduction is permanent. In contrast to the assortment reduction 
literature, most out-of-stock studies show that temporary assortment unavailability leads to significant sales 
losses (Campo, Gijsbrechts, and Nisol 2000; Emmelhainz, Stock, and Emmelhainz 1991; Sloot, Verhoef, 
and Franses 2005). This loss seems surprising because the temporary assortment unavailability of a brand 
seems less severe than the permanent assortment unavailability of a brand. However, when Campo, 
Gijsbrechts, and Nisol (2004) investigate the differences between consumer reactions to out-of-stocks and 
permanent assortment delistings more systematically, they conclude that the effect of a permanent 
assortment reduction in terms of sales losses is, as expected, greater than the effect of temporary 
assortment reductions.  
On the basis of the preceding literature review, we can derive several conclusions. First, prior 
literature on assortment reductions has not considered brand delistings as a distinct type of assortment 
reduction. Instead, previous studies focus on measuring the effect of a specific number of item deletions 
on, for example, assortment perception or category sales. Because item deletions still allow the possibility 
of switching to other items of the same brand, the effect of brand delistings, in which case no switching 
alternatives for the same brand are available, might be different. The only exception to this trend is 
Boatwright and Nunes (2001), who show that if an item delisting implies a brand delisting, the effect on 
category sales is more negative than if not all the items of a brand are delisted. Although this finding 
emphasizes the possible negative effect of brand delistings, their study does not provide an in-depth 
investigation of the effect of brand delistings. Because brands differ in terms of brand equity, as a result of 
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advertising and R&D investments, we question whether consumers react differently to a delisting of a high-
equity brand than they do to a delisting of a low-equity brand.  
Second, previous literature provides some contrasting results. Several natural experiments have 
shown that assortment reduction can lead to a growth in category sales (e.g., Boatwright and Nunes 2001; 
Drèze, Hoch, and Purk 1994). These findings contrast with findings from the out-of-stock literature, which 
demonstrate that most out-of-stock situations lead to category sales losses. Third, most studies in the 
assortment reduction literature stream are descriptive in nature and do not test models that include several 
antecedents to explain the effect of a brand delisting. This limitation causes a gap in retailers’ 
understanding of the factors that affect brand delisting responses.  
 In the following sections, we present two studies on the effect of brand delistings in our attempt to 
fill the preceding research gaps. Study 1 involves a controlled experiment in which consumers’ primary 
brand is delisted. Study 2 employs an in-store survey in which consumers are confronted with the 
hypothetical delisting of a brand they have just purchased.  
 
STUDY 1 
In Study 1, we specifically focus on measuring the effect of brand equity, assortment size, and 
assortment structure on AE and SSI if the consumers’ primary brand, whether high or low equity, is 
delisted. In a controlled experiment, we test whether consumers’ reactions to this brand delisting depend on 
assortment size (number of brands within the category) or assortment structure (proportion of high-equity 
brands) presented to the respondent after the brand was delisted. The inclusion of the dependent variable 
AE is based on prior research on the effect of item de-listings and category space on assortment 
perceptions (Broniarczyk, Hoyer, and McAlister 1998). Our inclusion of the dependent variable “SSI with 
regard to purchase in the product category” is based on the notion that delistings may affect category and 
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store sales if customers no longer or less frequently buy products in the store in which the delisting 
occurred (Boatwright and Nunes 2001; Campo, Gijsbrechts, and Nisol 2003; Drèze, Hoch, and Purk 1994).  
Hypotheses 
Brand Equity of Delisted Brand 
Chandon, Wansink, and Laurent (2000) distinguish between high- and low-equity brands. A brand 
has high customer-based brand equity if consumers react more favorably to a product when the brand is 
identified than when it is not (Keller 2002), whereas a brand with low equity does not provide many benefits 
and is purchased mainly because of its low price (Chandon, Wansink, and Laurent 2000). High-equity 
brands enjoy higher perceived quality, brand preference, and brand awareness than do low-equity brands 
(Aaker 1991; Keller 2002), which enables retailers to charge a price premium for them (Ailawadi, Lehmann, 
and Neslin 2003). Consumers of high-equity brands tend to be more committed to their brand (Aaker 1991), 
which makes a negative reaction to a brand delisting more likely. Retailers offer both low- and high-equity 
brands within their product category assortment so that they can fulfill the heterogeneous needs of their 
customers (Hoch, Bradlow, and Wansink 1999). In an assortment reduction context, Broniarczyk, Hoyer, 
and McAlister (1998) show that delisting less preferred items has a smaller impact on assortment 
perceptions than does delisting more preferred items. Sloot, Verhoef, and Franses (2005) show that, in the 
context of an out-of-stock situation, the brand equity of the unavailable item negatively affects store loyalty. 
Therefore, we propose that the brand equity of the delisted brand will affect both AE and SSI.  
H1: When a high-equity brand is delisted, (a) AE will be lower and (b) SSI will be higher than when a 
low-equity brand is delisted. 
Assortment Size 
When the consumers’ primary brand is delisted, the assortment size in terms of the number of 
remaining brands in the category may reduce the effects of the delisting on AE and SSI. First, a larger 
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assortment provides consumers with more switching alternatives (Campo, Gijsbrechts, and Nisol 2000), 
which may lead to higher AE and lower SSI. Second, because of their need for variety seeking, many 
consumers will use several brands to fulfill their category requirements (Van Trijp, Hoyer, and Inman 1996), 
so a larger assortment may lead to higher AEs. Moreover, Broniarzyck, Hoyer, and McAllister (1998) show 
that larger assortments have a higher AE when the preferred item is delisted.   
H2: When consumers’ primary brand is delisted from a large assortment, (a) AE will be higher and (b) 
SSI will be lower than it would be for small assortments.  
Assortment Structure 
In line with H1 regarding the effect of the brand equity of the delisted brand, we define the 
assortment structure as the proportion of high-equity brands (versus low-equity brands) in the category. 
Assortment structure may influence both AE and SSI. First, because consumers are more committed to 
high-equity brands than to low-equity brands, they probably will value assortments with a high proportion of 
high-equity brands over assortments with a low proportion of high-equity brands (Kahn and Lehmann 
1991). Second, in a delisting situation, consumers are forced to make new purchase decisions and search 
for alternatives within the assortment because they cannot buy their preferred brand. During this search 
and evaluation process, consumers will try to reduce their risks (Campo, Gijsbrechts, and Nisol 2000). 
High-equity brands are particular suited to reduce risks because they are well known and have a higher 
perceived quality (Aaker 1996) and therefore are usually more acceptable alternatives than are low-equity 
brands. That is, assortments with a high proportion of high-equity brands provide more acceptable 
alternatives than do assortments with a low proportion of high-equity brands.  
H3: When customers’ primary brand is delisted and the assortment offers a high proportion of high-
equity brands, (a) AE will be higher and (b) SSI will be lower than when the assortment offers a low 
proportion of high-equity brands. 
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Interaction Effect: Brand Equity × Assortment Structure 
If consumers are confronted with a delisting of their primary brand, they are forced into a new 
decision-making process, during which they might search for brands they consider acceptable alternatives. 
A consumer who regularly buys low-priced (low-equity) brands will search for alternatives in the same 
equity range to achieve the same value. This phenomenon is, to some extent, comparable to the tendency 
of consumers to purchase the same type of brands (e.g., private labels) in different categories (Batra and 
Sinha 2000; Richardson, Jain and Dick 1996). Thus, when a high- (low-) equity brand is delisted and there 
are relatively few high- (low-) equity brands in the remaining assortment, there will be fewer acceptable 
alternatives than when there are relatively more high- (low-) equity brands.  
H4: When consumers’ primary brand is delisted and the equity of the delisted brand is congruent with 
the equity structure of the assortment, (a) AE will be higher and (b) SSI will be lower than when 
they are not congruent. 
Interaction Effect: Assortment Size × Assortment Structure 
Kahn and Lehmann (1991) show that consumers’ assortment preference is positively affected by a 
combination of assortment size and assortment variety. This finding may be relevant for the interaction 
effect between assortment size and assortment structure because an assortment with a high proportion of 
high-equity brands may be perceived to offer more variety than an assortment with a low proportion of high-
equity brands. From a consumer’s perspective, a “complete” assortment may be one that carries most of 
the available brands (assortment size) and in which all the well-known (high-equity) brands are available. In 
this respect, we expect that an extensive assortment that is missing several high-equity brands will be 
considered incomplete by consumers compared with an extensive assortment that carries all high-equity 
brands but excludes a few low-equity brands.  
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H5: When consumers’ primary brand is delisted, assortment size’s positive effect on (a) AE and 
negative effect on (b) SSI will be greater for those assortments with a high proportion of high-equity 
brands than for those with a low proportion of high-equity brands.  
Experimental Design 
Procedure and Measurement 
We test our hypotheses in a controlled experiment with 395 respondents, who were participants in 
an online panel of buyers of regular beer in the Netherlands. An international beer brewer with several 
leading brands in the Netherlands provided access to this panel. On the basis of information about their 
past beer buying behavior, respondents were confronted with an assortment that excluded the brand they 
previously bought most often (primary brand). The shown assortment varied in size (6 or 9 brands)1 and 
structure (one-third high-equity brands or two-thirds high-equity brands). Each respondent was randomly 
assigned to one of the four experimental conditions. Within each condition, the brands presented to the 
consumer were randomly selected from a list of seven high- and seven low-equity brands, which together 
represented more than 90% of the total sales in the regular beer category.  
We assigned the brands to the two brand equity categories as follows: In a survey, 40 food industry 
managers rated the brand equity level of the 14 selected beer brands by noting on a seven-point scale the 
perceived quality (high versus low), perceived price level (high versus low), and perceived consumer 
preference (high versus low) for each brand (Chandon, Wansink, and Laurent 1998). The Cronbach’s 
alphas, calculated across participants for each brand, averaged .88. We averaged the scores across the 
three items and used a median split to assign seven brands each to the two groups.  
After viewing an online presentation of the assortment (see Figure 1), respondents filled in a 
questionnaire that assessed their AE and SSI. For their AE, we used a three-item (negative–positive, 
                                                 
1 Store checks revealed that most service supermarkets carry assortments that vary between 6 and 9 beer brands; most of these 
brands can be considered high-equity brands. 
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unattractive–attractive, and not inviting–inviting), bipolar, seven-point scale (Ketel, van Bruggen, and 
Smidts 2003). The coefficient alpha for the scale is .90. Because SSI is relatively straightforward, we used 
a single-item, five-point scale (Rossiter 2002) on which respondents indicated the probability that they 
would switch to another store for future purchases of regular beer (1 = will definitely keep on buying regular 
beer in this store, 5 = will definitely go to other stores to buy regular beer).  
 
-- Insert figure 1 about here -- 
 
Sample 
The sampling frame consisted of more than 18,000 regular beer buyers participating in an online 
beer panel. Only subjects who were primary buyers of one of the fourteen selected regular beer brands 
could be part of the sample. To include a substantial number of low-equity buyers, we used a stratified 
sampling procedure to select the subjects. For each brand, we set a target response of 25 respondents, but 
because the total number of primary buyers for low-equity brands was relatively low within the beer panel, 
we could not achieve this target for some of these brands. Assuming a response rate of approximately 
50%, 705 regular beer buyers were invited to participate in the online survey, and 395 (56%) responded. Of 
the respondents, 42% were classified as low-equity buyers and 58% as high-equity buyers. 
Experimental Results 
We provide the average AE and SSI scores in Table 1. To test the significance of the three 
independent variables and the two interaction variables, we use an ANOVA (394 degrees of freedom [d.f.] 
and 5 d.f., respectively). We display the ANOVA results in Table 2. 
 
-- Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here -- 
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Main Effects 
The first hypothesis predicts that AE will be lower (H1a) and SSI will be higher (H1b) when a high-
equity brand is delisted than when a low-equity brand is delisted. In support of these hypotheses, the AE is 
lower (3.86 versus 4.38; F = 15.1, p < .01) and SSI is higher  (3.55 versus 2.9; F = 20.1, p < .01) for high-
equity brand delistings than for low-equity brand delistings. We also find support for the proposition that AE 
will be higher (H2a) and SSI lower (H2b) when a brand delisting occurs in a large instead of a small 
assortment; AE is higher for larger assortments (3.92 versus 4.24; F = 5.8, p < .01), and SSI is higher for 
smaller assortments (3.41 versus 3.18; F = 3.0, p < .01). Finally, H3a and H3b predict that, when the 
percentage of high-equity brands is higher, AE will be higher and SSI will be lower. Our results show that 
consumers evaluate assortments that consist of two-thirds high-equity brands higher than they do 
assortments with one-third high-equity brands (4.30 versus 3.84; F = 10.8, p < .01), and their intention to 
switch stores is lower when the assortment consists of two-thirds high-equity brands (3.14 versus 3.46; F = 
4.7, p < .05), in support of H3a and H3b.  
Interaction Effects 
Although H4a, which proposes an interaction effect between the brand equity of the delisted brand 
and the assortment structure on AE, is not supported (F = 1.3, p > .10), we find weak support for H4b (F = 
2.1; p < .10), which predicts the effect for SSI (Fig. 2). As we show in Figure 2, the assortment structure 
might reduce the absolute effect of brand equity on SSI. We also find support for the hypothesized 
interaction effects between assortment structure and assortment size (H5a: F = 2.6, p < .10; H5b: F = 4.2, p 
< .05), as we show in Figure 3. Thus, the effect of assortment size in assortments with a high percentage of 
high-equity brands is smaller than in assortments with a low percentage of high-equity brands. 
  
-- Insert Figure 2 and 3 about here -- 
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Mediating Effect of Assortment Evaluations 
Broniarczyk, Hoyer, and McAllister (1998) show that assortment perceptions may mediate the 
effect of assortment characteristics on store choice. We therefore estimated an ANOVA for SSI in which we 
include AE as a covariate (see Table 2). In line with Broniarczyk, Hoyer, and McAllister (1998), we find that 
AE relates strongly to SSI (F = 139.9, p < .01) and acts as a mediating variable for the effect of assortment 
size on SSI. It also mediates the effect of assortment structure. However, the effect of brand equity remains 
significant in this model (F = 8.4, p < .01). Thus, brand equity has a direct effect on SSI when we control for 
the effect of AE.  
STUDY 2 
In Study 2, we develop and test a conceptual model by which we attempt to understand the 
determinants of SSI and CI after a delisting. We use in-store surveys of 1213 consumers, collected in 16 
supermarkets of four retail chains, that pertained to purchases in 10 preselected product categories.  Unlike 
in Study 1, we focus solely on behavioral intentions here. Moreover, whereas the SSI variable in Study 1 
basically measured SSIs at the category level (buy brand in another store), here we study the impact of 
delistings on switching intentions at the store level (fewer visits to the store in which the hypothetical brand 
delisting occurs). This type of SSI results in sales losses that extend beyond category sales losses in the 
product category in which the delisting occurs. In addition, we include CI as a consequence of brand 
delistings because, theoretically, complaining is an important consumer response if consumers are 
dissatisfied with the product or service (Singh 1990). Moreover, in-depth interviews with four retail 
managers revealed that retailers carefully compile complaints after a delisting operation and use them to 
consider whether to relist the brand in the assortment. 
 In this second study, we include the same independent variables (brand equity, assortment size, 
and assortment structure) as in Study 1, but we also test hypothesized interaction effects. The breadth of 
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this study (16 supermarkets of four different retail chains, 10 different product categories) provides 
generalizability for the findings of Study 1. We also include other antecedents of SSI and CI, which can be 
classified as: (1) brand-related, (2) product category–related, (3) retail assortment–related, and (4) store-
related antecedents. By including only objective variables (i.e., no individual perceptions, such as brand 
preference, brand, loyalty, or store preference), we distinguish this model, prevent common method bias, 
and provide a model that can be used easily by retailers to estimate the effects of several proposed brand 
delistings.  
Hypotheses 
Brand-Related Antecedents 
The first group of variables relates to the specific brand for which the brand delisting occurs. In line 
with Study 1, we consider the brand equity of the delisted brand an explanatory variable for SSI (H1). We 
expect that the brand equity level of the delisted brand will relate positively to CI because we assume that 
consumers are more committed to high-equity than to low-equity brands. A second brand characteristic is 
the type of delisted brand, for which we distinguish between store and manufacturer brands (Dhar and 
Hoch 1997). In contrast with manufacturer brands, store brands are distributed only in a particular retail 
chain, which means that if a store brand is delisted, consumers cannot switch to a competing store to 
obtain the same store brand. Several researchers also have suggested that store brands are associated 
with higher store loyalty (Corstjens and Lal 2000; Steenkamp and Dekimpe 1997), though other 
researchers argue that heavy users of store brands are loyal to store brands in general, not necessarily to 
the store brand of a particular retailer (Ailawadi and Harlam 2004). Because consensus does not exist for 
this point, we do not formulate a hypothesis about the relationship between type of brand and SSI and CI.  
H6: The brand equity level of the delisted brand will be positively related to (a) SSI and (b) CI. 
Product Category–Related Antecedents 
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The first product category variable is the type of product: utilitarian or hedonic (Batra and Ahtola 
1991). Hedonic products, such as ice cream and salty snacks, provide more experiential consumption (i.e., 
fun, pleasure, excitement), whereas utilitarian product, such as detergents and toilet paper, provide 
primarily instrumental and functional benefits (Dhar and Wertenbroch 2000; Hirschman and Holbrook 
1982). The different nature of utilitarian and hedonic products may affect the buying process, in that the 
buying process of utilitarian products may be driven mainly by rational buying motives, whereas that of 
hedonic products includes emotional motives as well. Because of these emotional buying motives, 
consumers may be more committed to brands in hedonic product categories than to those in utilitarian 
product categories. Therefore, we expect that consumers will demonstrate higher SSIs and CIs if a brand 
delisting occurs in a hedonic rather than a utilitarian product category. 
The second considered product category–related variable is the concentration level of brands in 
the product category. A highly concentrated product group is characterized by few dominant brands with 
high market shares, which may reflect significant perceived differences between these dominant brands 
and others. We measure brand concentration level as the squared market shares of each brand to 
encompass the combined market power of the available brands (Ailawadi and Harlam 2004). Therefore, we 
expect that a high concentration level will relate positively to SSIs and CIs, because if consumers do not 
consider other brands good alternatives, they will either visit another store or complain.  
The third product-related variable we study is the number of brands in the product category. If this 
number is greater, it should be easier for consumers to find an acceptable alternative in the case of a brand 
delisting. However, a higher number of brands in a category also may signal a segmented market in terms 
of consumer preferences (Narasimhan, Neslin, and Sen 1996) because retailers offer many brands when 
they assume large variety in consumer needs for a category (Hoch, Bradlow, and Wansink 1999). In this 
case, because each brand satisfies a specific need, there are no suitable alternatives in the assortment. In 
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summary, because we find opposing arguments for the effect of the number of brands on SSI and CI, we 
do not put forward a directional hypothesis for this effect.   
H7: The type of product will be positively related to (a) SSI and (b) CI. 
H8: The concentration level of brands in the product category will be positively related to (a) SSI and 
(b) CI. 
Retail Assortment–Related Antecedents 
The third group of antecedents we distinguish relates to the product category assortment offered 
by the retailer. As in Study 1, we consider assortment size, but in Study 2, we measure it as the number of 
brands offered by the retailer in a certain category compared with the number of brands offered in the same 
category by other participating retailers. In line with Study 1, we hypothesize that assortment size 
negatively relates to SSI, and we also expect that it is negatively related to CI. When faced with a smaller 
assortment, which makes it more difficult to find a suitable alternative, consumers are more likely to 
complain. 
We also consider assortment structure. In line with Study 1, we expect that assortments with a high 
proportion of high-equity brands will have lower SSI; we use similar reasoning to hypothesize that 
consumers will be less likely to complain.  
H9: The assortment size will be negatively related to (a) SSI and (b) CI. 
H10: The assortment structure will be negatively related to (a) SSI and (b) CI. 
Store-Related Antecedents 
Finally, the fourth group of antecedents pertains to the type of retail situation in which the brand 
delisting occurs. The first variable we study is store type, which we distinguish between price- and service-
oriented stores (Shankar and Bolton 2004). Service-oriented stores generally carry a wider and deeper 
assortment, offer better facilities (e.g., parking lot, shopping assistance), and have a higher price level than 
price-oriented stores. We expect that SSIs are lower if the brand delisting occurs in a service-oriented 
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store, because consumers will have more alternatives from which to choose. However, the expected effect 
of store type on CI is not in line with its effect on SSI. Because expectations are based on prior experiences 
with the store (Boulding et al. 1993), customers of service-oriented stores may have higher expectations 
about assortment availability than customers of price-oriented stores. Therefore, a brand delisting should 
create more dissatisfaction for shoppers at service-oriented stores than for shoppers at price-oriented 
stores, which may lead to a higher level of complaining by shoppers of service-oriented stores.  
The second store-related variable is the number of alternative stores. Theoretically, the costs of 
switching to another store are lower if the number of alternative stores in the environment is higher 
(Campo, Gijsbrechts, and Nisol 2000), so the number of alternative stores should be positively related to 
SSI. However, the effect of the number of alternative stores on CI is less clear. Consumers may be more 
demanding when there are many stores, but this scenario also may provide consumers with more 
alternatives, which may lead them to consider complaining a waste of time. Therefore, we do not 
hypothesize about the relation between the number of alternative stores and CI. 
H11:  Store type will be (a) negatively related to SSI and (b) positively related to CI. 
H12: The number of alternative stores will be (a) positively related to SSI. 
Control Variables 
As control variables, we include age and gender in our model. We also include “promotional buy” to 
measure whether the hypothetically delisted brand was on a promotion. Consumers may not be as brand 
loyal to a brand purchased on promotion as they are to a brand purchased without a promotion. Therefore, 
we expect that promotional buy is negatively related to SSI and CI and should be included as a control 
variable.  
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Research Methodology 
Data Collection 
Data about consumer brand delisting responses were collected using a survey. In line with out-of-
stock research, we use a hypothetical brand delisting (Campo, Gijsbrechts, and Nisol 2000) so that we can 
study brand delisting behavior for various brands in different categories, and in different stores. Although 
brands might be delisted in a natural experiment as well, a natural experiment would limit the scale of the 
research to a small number of stores, product categories, and brands, which undermines our ability to 
develop and test a conceptual model with, for example, product category– and store-related antecedents.  
Data were collected by four experienced interviewers employed by a research agency through 
personal interviews with respondents who had just visited a supermarket. The interviews took place in 16 
different supermarkets that belong to four retail chains (four stores per chain). Through visual inspection of 
the consumers’ shopping baskets at the checkout lanes, the interviewers preselected consumers who 
purchased the product groups of interest. After they left the checkout area, the preselected consumers 
were asked to participate in a study about their shopping behavior. Approximately 60% of the preselected 
consumers agreed to participate. A basket analysis was conducted to highlight the brand of interest, and 
questions pertaining to brand delisting responses were asked with reference to that purchased brand. The 
advantage of interviewing shoppers shortly after their shopping trip is that consumers can recall more easily 
their real decision-making situation. We believe this data collection procedure enhances the realism of the 
brand delisting situation and therefore the validity of the responses.  
Interviews took place throughout the week and the individual days to ensure a regular pattern of 
shoppers. In total, 1213 respondents participated in the study. Actual responses per product category 
varied between 93 (rice) and 151 (cola) (see Table 3).  
 
-- Insert Table 3 about here -- 
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Dependent Variables 
As we mentioned previously, with this study we hope to measure the effect of a hypothetical brand 
delisting on SSI and CI. Although consumers’ intentions about future behavior in this context cannot be 
translated perfectly to actual future behavior, research shows that intentions are related to actual behavior 
(Morwitz, Steckel, and Gupta 1997). Therefore, to measure the dependent variables, we used the following 
procedure: After selecting the brand of interest from among the 10 specified product groups, the interviewer 
asked the consumer what he or she probably would do in the future if the store decided to delist the brand. 
Consumers rated their SSI on a five-point scale, in which they could indicate their probability of visiting the 
store (1) as frequently as before, (2) somewhat less often, (3) less often, (4) much less often, or (5) stop 
buying at the store at all. In case of a brand delisting, 2.8% of the consumers said they would probably stop 
buying at the store at all, whereas 88.7% indicated that they would visit the store as frequently as before. 
To measure CI, we used a three-item formative scale (Fornell 1987) developed on the basis of Singh’s 
(1990) work. Consumers were asked to indicate the probability they would engage in each of the following 
complaining actions: (1) ask a store employee about the delisting, (2) send a complaint to consumer 
services, and (3) tell about the brand delisting to third parties (e.g., friends, family). These three items may 
be considered a set of distinct facets of the CI construct. For example, a disappointed consumer may ask 
the stores’ employee about the delisting but not send a complaining letter to the organization. Indeed, 
interitem correlations among the three complaining items are rather low (r between .2 and .3). In this 
situation, we therefore define the latent variable CI using a linear sum of the three complaining items 
(Bagozzi 1994). 
Independent Variables 
To prevent common method bias (Baumgartner and Steenkamp 2001; Bickart 1993), we measured 
the independent variables separately from the dependent variables. Therefore, we limited the measures 
used for objective or intersubjective measures, with the exceptions of the control variables promotional buy, 
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age, and gender, which we could measure in a straightforward way. We provide all the measures in the 
Appendix.  
Brand-related antecedents. In designating each of the hypothetically delisted brands as either a 
manufacturer or a store brand, we used the evaluations of 40 food industry managers for three brand equity 
dimensions: (1) perceived quality, (2) perceived price level, and (3) perceived consumer preference 
(Chandon, Wansink, and Laurent 2000). The managers used a seven-point Likert scale to rate each brand 
on each of the three brand equity indicators (1 = low, 7 = high). The average alpha score among the 111 
brands  was .78, with a standard deviation of .086; therefore, we summated the scores for the three items 
and calculated the average brand equity score for each brand, which we then employed in our database. 
Product-related antecedents. We assessed the hedonic level of the product category with the same 
group of 40 food industry managers, who scored each product category on the following items: (1) 
attractive, (2) nice, and (3) enjoyment (1 = low, 7 = high) (Batra and Ahtola 1991). The average coefficient 
alpha across the 10 product categories was .79 (see Table 3). We summated the three items, calculated 
the average score for each category, and included it in our database as the hedonic-level score for each 
category. We operationalized the concentration level of a product category as a Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index. For each product group, we summated the squared market shares of each of the top four brands 
(Ailawadi and Harlam 2004; Schmalensee 1977). A number closer to 1 indicates a high concentration level, 
whereas a score closer to 0 indicates a low concentration level. We measured the number of brands 
antecedent as the number of brands available from each retailer, garnered from store checks, in the 
product category. 
Retail-assortment related antecedents. We calculated assortment size as an index that reveals the 
relative choice level for a particular product group from retailer X compared with the choice level for that 
product group offered by other participating retailers. For example, if retailer X offers 9 brands of beer and 
the average number of beer brands offered by all participating retailers is 12, the index for retailer X in the 
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beer category is .75. To assess the choice level of each store, we counted the number of brands offered by 
each considered store. For assortment structure, we measured the percentage of high-equity brands in the 
product category by the retailer. For example, if retailer A offers 9 brands of beer, 6 of which are classified 
as high-equity brands (based on a median split of the brand equity scores in the category), the assortment 
consists of .67% high equity brands and .33% low equity brands.   
 Store-related antecedents. For the variable store type, we distinguish between service- and price-
oriented stores on the basis of  supermarket classifications by the market research agency GfK (2004) of 
each of the 16 participating supermarkets. A store is classified as service oriented when its prices are 
relatively high and its assortment level is extended, whereas a store is classified as price oriented when its 
prices are rather low and its assortment is limited. Theoretically, an everyday low price store can combine 
low prices and a high service level, but Study 2 includes only hi-lo retailers (Kahn and McAlister 1997). We 
measured the number of alternatives stores as the number of stores in the same zip code area of the store 
at which the hypothetical delisting was investigated. 
Analysis 
In this study, we are interested in the effects of brand-, product category–, retail assortment–, and 
store-related variables on SSI and CI. The general model that holds for both delisting responses is 
formulated as follows (see the Appendix for abbreviations): 
Delisting responsei,b,p,r,s = α0 + 1BEi,b + α2BTi,b + α3PTi,p + α4CLi,p + α5NBi,p +α6ASi,p,r + α7STRi,p,r (1) 
   + α8STi,s + α9NASi,s + α10PBi + α11Sexi + α12Agei + βSDi+εi. 
   
Note that we model the response of consumer i for both independent variables, which means that we 
include variables for four different aggregation levels: brand level b, product category level p, retail 
assortment level r, and store level s. In this model we also account for possible store specific effects with 
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the inclusion of a vector of dummies for each store (SD). We also test for interaction effects between 
assortment structure and brand equity and between assortment structure and (relative) assortment size. To 
do so, we estimate an additional model in which we add the following interaction terms to Equation 1: 
STRi,p,r × BEi,b and STRi,p,r × ASi,p,r.  
We measure SSI on a single five-point scale. Because this scale should be considered an ordinal 
scale, we use an ordered probit model instead of the standard linear regression model to estimate Equation 
1 (Long 1997). In an ordered probit model, the observed response variable is modeled on an underlying 
continuous variable yi*, which depends linearly on explanatory variables. We estimate the model with 
maximum likelihood in E-Views 4.0. To estimate the effect of our explanatory variables on assortment 
satisfaction and complaining behavior, we use a standard linear regression model with ordinary least 
squares, because the summation of the three CIs can be considered an interval scale. 
Prior to estimating the model for Equation 1, we assess whether multicollinearity might cause 
severe problems in our data by considering the correlation among the independent variables (see Table 4). 
In general, the correlation between the independent variables is low. We also compute the variance 
inflation factors and find that all are less than 2. Therefore, we conclude that multicollinearity will not affect 
our estimation results (Hair et al. 1998; Leeflang et al. 2000). We use White’s (1980) method to correct for 
potential heteroscedasticity in the errors and variables. 
 
-- Insert Table 4 about here –  
 
Empirical Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
We used median splits to classify the antecedents into low-equity versus high-equity brands and 
then calculated the average SSI and CI for each group. We also used median splits to distinguish between 
store-loyal and store-switching consumers and complainers and noncomplainers. In Table 5, we report the 
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average SSI and CI and the percentages of store switchers and complainers for each antecedent.  We find 
substantial significant differences that underline the importance of several of the antecedents in our 
conceptual model (Table 5). For example, if a high-equity brand is delisted, 17% of its buyers indicate that 
they will visit the store less frequently. For a low-equity brand, this percentage is only 8%. If a brand 
delisting occurs in a product group with a high hedonic level, 20% of its buyers indicate that they would be 
less loyal to the store, whereas the percentage of store switchers for brand delistings in low hedonic 
product categories is only 7% 
-- Insert Table 5 about here -- 
 
Store Switching Intentions 
We present the estimation results of Equation 1 in Table 6. The model for SSI is significant and 
explains 20% of the variance, according to the R2 of McKelvey and Zavoina (1975). We find that five of the 
seven hypothesized effects are significant (four at p < .05, one at p < .10). In particular, we find a positive 
effect of brand equity, product type (hedonic level), and concentration level on SSI. We find negative 
significant coefficients for assortment size (p = .08) and assortment structure. Furthermore, the analyses 
show that the number of brands in the category is positively related to SSI, which confirms the findings of 
Narasimhan, Neslin, and Sen (1996) that categories with many brands reflect heterogeneity in the market, 
which leads to fewer good alternatives for delisted brands. Together, these results support H6a, H7a, H8a, 
H9a, and H10a. However, we do not find support for both store- related hypotheses H11a or H12. Our results 
also confirm the results of Study 1, in which we found significant effects for brand equity, assortment size, 
and assortment structure. We also tested for interaction effects between assortment structure and brand 
equity and between assortment size and assortment structure, but our results reveal no significant 
interaction effects (p = .44; p = .12), so our findings from Study 1 with regard to these interaction effects are 
not replicated in Study 2. 
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-- Insert Table 6 about here -- 
 
Complaining Intentions 
Our model explaining CIs is significant and explains 10,7% of the variance. Specifically, we find 
five of the six hypothesized effects are significant (four at p < .01, one at p < .10). Similar to our findings for 
SSI, we find a positive effect of brand equity, product type, and concentration level. Furthermore, we find 
that store type is positively related to CI. Thus, customers of service-oriented supermarkets are more 
inclined to complain in response to a brand delisting. Also, the number of alternative stores is positively 
related to CI. This supports the idea that consumers who have more stores in the vicinity tend to be more 
critical about the assortment that should be available. We also find a positive significant effect of the 
number of brands, which confirms again that the number of brands reflects heterogeneity in the category. 
We find a positive effect for age that implies that older consumers are more inclined to complain than are 
younger consumers. Also similar to our explanation of SSI, we find a negative significant effect for 
assortment structure (p = .08). Our results thus support H6b, H7b, H8b, H10b, and H11b but not H9b. Finally,  we 
estimated the interaction effects between assortment structure and brand equity and between assortment 
structure and assortment size and find marginal support for the interaction effects indicated in Study 1 (β = 
-0.31, p = .07; β = -3.28, p = .09). Note, however, that the dependent variable CI differs from the AE and 
SSI variables measured in Study 1. 
DISCUSSION 
With this research, we study the impact of brand delisting on AE, SSI, and CI. We thereby 
contribute to the literature on the effects of assortment reductions in several ways. First, our research 
setting differs from other studies of assortment reduction because its starting point is the delisting of the 
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consumers’ preferred brand. Previous natural and controlled experiments have focused on measuring the 
effect of multiple item delistings within or across categories. Our focus on brand delisting also adds to the 
understanding of the effect of brand-specific characteristics, such as brand equity, on consumer responses 
to a brand delisting.  
Second, our focus on single brand delistings instead of assortment reduction is in line with recent 
retail management developments. In the 1990s, many retailers aimed to increase their operating profits by 
creating efficient assortments (Food Marketing Institute 1993). On many occasions, retailers reduced their 
assortments by 10%–15% by removing low-selling stockkeeping units (ECR Europe 1998). In today’s 
retailing environment, brand delistings continue to be common. Due to the growth of private labels, retailers 
believe they are less dependent on individual national brands (Serdar, Hoch, and Raju 2002; Steenkamp 
and Dekimpe 1997). In addition, retailers have begun to consider their distinctive assortments in their 
decisions about which brands to list, which means that fewer retailers are interested in selling all well-
known brands. Finally, to improve buying conditions, retailers threaten manufacturers with brand delisting.  
Third, various studies on assortment reductions seem to suggest that assortment reductions may 
not harm or even be beneficial for retailers. Our study reveals that the majority of brand delistings will lead 
to lower AEs and at least some disappointed customers. In most brand delisting situations, at least a small 
percentage of consumers indicate that they would be less loyal to a store that delisted their preferred 
brand, which implies a potential sales loss beyond the product category in which the delisting occurs. Prior 
findings might not include this effect because these negative consequences may be weaker for pure item 
deletions or may not be statistically significant at an aggregate level. However, an overall store sales loss of 
a “statistically marginal” 1% of consumers due to a brand delisting is very significant for the retailers’ 
operating profit. 
Fourth, prior studies of assortment reductions have not developed a conceptual model that 
attempts to explain brand delisting consequences on the consumer level. Usually, such studies are 
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descriptive in nature (Drèze, Hoch, and Purk 1993; Food Marketing Institute 1993) or consider only a 
limited number of explanatory variables, such as assortment size or item preference. Also, prior studies 
have been based on a limited number of categories and/or stores. In this study, we include several new 
variables, such as brand equity, assortment structure, product type, and store type. Furthermore, we test 
the effect of these antecedents on brand delisting responses in 16 different stores and 10 product groups, 
which enables use to generalize our findings across stores and product categories. We suggest that the 
variance in the brand delisting responses across stores, product categories, and brands may explain the 
mixed results in natural experiments on assortment reduction.  
We consider the following findings the most important of our research: First, delisting high-equity 
brands has stronger negative effects than does delisting low-equity brands. The effects of high-equity brand 
delistings are, however, less negative if retailers provide sufficient alternative high-equity brands in their 
remaining assortments. However, brand loyalty toward even so-called “small brands” may be very high for 
individual consumers, such as was the case for “fanatic” Double-Cola buyers (Wolburg 2003). Second, 
brand delistings have stronger negative consequences when they are executed in product categories with a 
high hedonic level, such as beer, cola, or cigarettes. Third, in line with prior assortment reduction literature, 
retailers who provide a large category assortment are less affected by brand delistings. However, this 
finding does not imply that delisting brands in categories that contain a high number of brands will be less 
harmful; rather, we find that in categories that carry many brands (e.g., beer), brand delistings have greater 
negative consequences than they do in categories with only a few brands. A possible explanation for this 
counterintuitive finding may be that the absolute number of brands in a category is a reflection of a narrowly 
segmented market in terms of consumer preferences (Narasimhan, Neslin, and Sen 1996). Fourth, we find 
that CIs after a brand delisting are higher for service-oriented stores than for price-oriented stores, but SSIs 
do not differ between store types.  
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MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
Retailers have several motivations for brand delistings. Our main conclusion is that retailers should 
be carefull when delisting brands, because it may result in significant sales losses among buyers of the 
delisted brands. Note, that a small loss in category sales may be mitigated by the cost savings and lead to 
an improved operating profit. Furthermore, retailers can decide to reduce their assortment and lower the 
average price level in the category at the same time, which may even lead to growing category sales and 
an improved assortment perception among the total group of buyers. In some situations, retailers may think 
that they offer too much choice within a category, particularly if former extensions in assortment size did not 
result in category sales increases. In such situations, assortment reduction may decrease the level of 
overproliferation in the category, though even in this scenario, retailers must recognize that most brand 
delistings will result in some dissatisfied customers. Therefore, retailers should develop communication 
methods that lower the negative effects of a brand delisting. For example, market leader Albert Heijn in the 
Netherlands decided to delist the brand Kanis & Gunnik. Using information from its loyalty card program, 
the store identified approximately 15,000 heavy users of the brand and sent these users a letter in which it 
explained the delisting reasons. The letter also contained a coupon offer for an alternative brand. 
We believe that there are two major implications of our findings for retailers. First, two major variables 
are very important in the context of brand delistings: brand equity and hedonic level. Retailers should be 
especially careful when they delist high-equity brands in hedonic categories. When high-equity brands are 
delisted, a larger group of consumers indicates that they will switch to another store. Moreover, additional 
analysis suggests that brand equity is strongly correlated with market share. Because high-equity brands 
often have high market shares, delisting a high-equity brand will affect more consumers. 
Second, our results show that a large assortment size may mitigate the negative effects of delistings, 
which means there are better opportunities for delistings in large assortments. However, many retailers, 
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especially price-oriented stores, have reduced their assortment sizes dramatically. If smaller assortments 
lead to stronger negative delisting effects, at some point past the minimum required assortment size, 
further reductions will no longer be feasible. 
Although this study focuses on the retailers’ perspective, the results may be useful for brand 
manufacturers as well. By consistently building brand equity, manufacturers can strengthen their brand to 
such a level that retailers would have difficulty delisting it. Thus, brand equity increases not only the price 
premium that consumers are willing to pay but also manufacturer power when negotiating buying conditions 
with retailers. Furthermore, as store loyalty in general is stronger than brand loyalty, manufacturers should 
develop strategies to connect the customer to their brands. For instance, Unilever developed its own 
consumer magazine Yata Yata that is distributed directly to households. With this magazine Unilever aims 
to improve the link between the consumer and the Unilever brands. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
A major limitation of our research is that the results in both studies are based on hypothetical 
situations. A possible drawback of this research design is that people do not always act the way they claim 
they would or have difficulty imagining what action they would take. This limitation may lower the external 
validity of the reported brand delisting responses. Therefore, we suggest that additional research should 
test the effects of actual brand delistings, though retailers may not be willing to cooperate with research in 
which several high-equity brands are delisted across several product groups. Another limitation of our study 
is that we measure the effect of a brand delisting among buyers of the delisted brand and therefore cannot 
comment on how nonbuyers of the delisted brand may react. The AE of nonbuyers of a delisted brand may 
even be more favorable after the delisting because fewer brands in the category might lower their search 
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costs. Further research therefore should test the effect of a brand delisting on the assortment perceptions 
of nonbuyers. 
Additional research also could focus on the long-term effects of brand delistings, because the 
majority of assortment reduction studies have considered only short-term effects. Brand delistings also are 
not executed in isolation. For example, a brand delisting may be accompanied by an increase in the service 
level of the store or the addition of new categories (e.g., bakery, coffee stand, more fresh food), which 
might eliminate some of the negative consequences of brand delistings. Moreover, consumers may be 
confronted with multiple brand delistings in a single and/or multiple categories, so further research should 
study this issue. 
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 Table 1. 
Descriptive Statistics of the Controlled Experiment (n = 383) 
 
 
Assortment  
Evaluation (1–7) 
Store Switching 
Intention (1–5)   
 Average Standard 
Deviation 
Average Standard 
Deviation 
n 
Equity of delisted brand 
- Low  
- High  
 
4.38 
3.86 
 
1.23 
1.42 
 
2.94 
3.45 
 
1.37 
1.32 
 
160 
223 
Assortment size 
- Small (6 brands) 
- Large (9 brands) 
 
3.92 
4.24 
 
1.38 
1.34 
 
3.41 
3.18 
 
1.33 
1.42 
 
196 
187 
Assortment structure 
- One-third high equity 
- Two-thirds high equity 
 
3.85 
4.30 
 
1.45 
1.24 
 
3.46 
3.14 
 
1.35 
1.38 
 
192 
191 
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Table 2. 
ANOVA Results  
 
 
Assortment 
Evaluation 
Store Switching 
Intention 
Store Switching 
Intention 
Variable F-value p-value F-value p-value  F-value p-value 
Brand equity (BE) 15.08 .000 20.203 .000 8.423 .002 
Assortment size (AS) 5.835 .008 3.027 .042 .471 .245 
Assortment structure (STR) 10.755 .005 4.683 .016 .767 .191 
BE × STR 1.295 .128 2.074 .076 1.274 .130 
AS × STR 2.622 .054 4.186 .021 2.000 .079 
Assortment evaluation     139.86 .000 
Notes:  p-values are one sided. Significant relations (p  < .05) are bolded. 
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Table 3. 
Hedonic Level as Judged by Managers of Selected Product Categories (n = 40) 
 
Product Category 
Cronbach's Alpha 
(three-item scale) 
Average Hedonic  
Level (1–7) 
Standard  
Deviation 
Margarine .83 3.40 1.21 
Rice .84 3.86 1.21 
Detergent .80 3.90 1.45 
Toilet paper .86 3.92 1.54 
Frozen vegetables .74 4.05 1.06 
Sauces .83 4.54 1.22 
Cola .82 5.03 1.22 
Coffee .54 5.38 0.81 
Beer .73 5.55 0.97 
Cigarettes .88 5.78 0.94 
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Table 4. 
 
Average, Standard Deviation (s.d.), and Correlation Coefficients for Variables in Study 2 (n = 1213)  
 Average s.d. SSI CI BE BT PT CL AS STR NB ST NAS PB SEX AGE 
SSI 1.29 0.85 1.00              
CI 2.79 1.38 .16 1.00             
BE 5.28 1.05 .16 .15 1.00            
BT 0.17 0.37 -.08 -.06 -.60 1.00           
PT 4.58 0.79 .15 .16 -.12 -.12 1.00          
CL 0.23 0.14 .15 .16 -.04 -.04 .19 1.00         
AS 1.00 0.11 -.02 .03 .05 .05 .00 -.02 1.00        
STR 0.56 0.17 -.06 -.05 -.11 -.11 -.24 .04 .01 1.00       
NB 7.04 1.97 -.02 .04 -.19 -.19 .07 -.38 .32 .19 1.00      
ST 0.50 0.50 .01 .10 .04 .04 .03 .01 .29 -.05 .13 1.00     
NAS 3.11 1.44 -.01 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.01 -.12 .00 -.05 -.12 1.00    
PB 0.12 0.33 -.04 -.06 .01 .01 -.11 -.05 -.01 -.02 -.03 .05 .02 1.00   
SEX 0.77 0.42 -.10 .01 .04 .04 -.13 -.00 .02 .05 -.02 .01 .06 .03 1.00  
AGE 2.55 0.85 -.01 .06 .04 .04 -.09 -.02 .02 -.08 .03 .13 .02 .00 .04 1.00 
Notes: The abbreviations and measurements of the dependent and independent variables appear in the Appendix. Significant relations (p  < .05) 
are bolded. 
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Table 5. 
Averages and Percentages of Store Switch Intentions and Complaining Intentions Per Antecedent  (n = 
1213) 
Antecedent Store Switch Intentions* Complaining Intentions** 
Brand equity   
(low versus high) 
1.17 
(8%) 
1.41 
(17%) 
2.62 
(41%) 
2.96 
(52%) 
Brand type  
(manufacturer versus store brand) 
1.32 
(14%) 
1.13 
(6%) 
2.83 
(47%) 
2.60 
(41%) 
Product type  
(low versus high hedonic level) 
1.14 
(7%) 
1.46 
(20%) 
2.53 
(38%) 
3.11 
(57%) 
Concentration level 
(low versus high) 
1.21 
(9%) 
1.39 
(17%) 
2.63 
(49%) 
2.99 
(53%) 
Assortment size 
(low versus high) 
1.31 
(14%) 
1.25 
(11%) 
2.82 
(48%) 
2.74 
(45%) 
Proportion of high-equity brands 
(low versus high) 
1.30 
(14%) 
1.23 
(9%) 
2.78 
(46%) 
2.80 
(48%) 
Number of brands 
(low versus high) 
1.32 
(14%) 
1.24 
(11%) 
2.76 
(44%) 
2.81 
(49%) 
Store type 
(price- versus service-oriented) 
1.28 
(13%) 
1.29 
(12%) 
2.65 
(42%) 
2.93 
(51%) 
Number of alternative stores 
(low versus high) 
1.30 
(14%) 
1.26 
(11%) 
2.78 
(45%) 
2.79 
(48%) 
Total 1.28 
(13%) 
2.78 
(46%) 
Note: Significant relations (p  < .05) are bolded. 
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Table 6. 
Estimation Results: Ordered Probit and Ordinary Least Squares Analyses, Study 2 (n = 1213)1,2 
 
 
Hypothesis 
Store Switching 
Intentions3 
Complaining 
Intentions 
Constant4  3.05 (.00) 
3.14 (.00) 
3.60 (.00) 
3.84 (.00) 
-.21 (.76) 
Brand-Related    
Brand equity (BE) 6a,b .13 (.02) .15 (.00) 
Brand type (BT) 
(1=store brand; 0=manufacturer brand) 
 -.12 (.27) .13 (.16) 
Product Category–Related    
Product type (PT) 7a,b .18 (.00) .17 (.00) 
Concentration level (CL) 8a,b 1.84 (.00) 1.49 (.00) 
Number of brands (NB)  .07 (.03) .07 (.00) 
Retail Assortment–Related    
Assortment size (AS) 9a,b -.81 (.08) -.38 (.17) 
Assortment structure (STR) 10a,b -.68 (.01) -.35 (.08) 
Store-Related    
Store type (ST) 
(1=service-oriented; 0=price-oriented) 
11a,b -.33 (.12) .36 (.02) 
Number of alternative stores (NAS) 12 .03 (.39) .18 (.01) 
Control Variables    
Promotional buy (PB) 
(1 = yes; 0 = no) 
 -.12 (.45) -.19 (.09) 
Gender (SEX) 
(1=female; 0=male) 
 -.19 (.07) .09 (.35) 
Age (AGE)  .03 (.67) .08 (.09) 
General Statistics    
LR statistic /F-value (p-value)  108.75 (.00) 5.48 (.00) 
(McKelvey and Zavoina) R2  .203 .107 
1We estimated several other model specifications (i.e., OLS instead of ordered probit) and systems of equations to account for 
correlations between errors. The estimated coefficients and accompanied p-values do not change significantly when we use 
these models. 
2We included dummy variables for each store to adjust for non-measured variance on the store level. For explaining SSI one of 
the store dummy variables is significant at p < .05, for explaining CI  two store dummy variables are significant at p < .05. 
3We report one-sided p-values for our hypothesized relationships and two-sided p-values for the constant and non-hypothesized 
variables. 
4In an ordered probit model, there is no single constant. Instead, we estimate four limit points (5–1). 
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Figure 1. 
Graphical Display of Assortment 
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Figure 2. 
Interaction Effect of Brand Equity × Assortment Structure 
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Figure 3. 
Interaction Effect of Assortment Structure × Assortment Size 
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Appendix 
Overview and Definition of Variables, Study 2 
Variable Concept Measurement Instrument 
 
Dependent Variables   
Store switching intention (SSI) Store visit frequency Degree of expected store visits in post-delisting period on five-
point scale (1 = same store visit frequency as before, 5 = stop 
buying at this store at all). 
Complaining intention (CI) Complaining actions Three-item formative scale (1–7) consisting of three distinct 
types of complaining behavior.  
Independent Variables   
Brand-related    
Brand equity (BE) 
 
Brand strength Degree of brand equity based on a three-item scale consisting 
of perceived price, perceived quality, and perceived consumer 
preference (1=low, 7 =high). Brands evaluated by a group of 
40 food industry managers. 
Brand type (BT) Manufacturer or retailer 
brand 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the brand is a retailer brand. 
Product category–related    
Product type (PT) Hedonic level of product Three-item scale consisting of attractive, nice, and enjoyment 
(1 = low, 7 = high). Product categories evaluated by a group of 
40 food industry managers.  
Concentration level (CL) Brand concentration  Squared market share of top four brands (Hirschman-
Herfindahl index). 
Number of brands (NB) Number of brands  Number of brands offered in product category of retailer X. 
Source: counts of number of brands in product category 
during store visits. 
Retail assortment–related   
Assortment size (AS) Relative number of brands  Relative number of brands offered in a product category 
compared with the average number of brands offered in the 
product group by all participating retailers. Source: counts of 
number of brands in product category during store visits. 
Assortment structure (STR) 
 
Proportion of high-equity 
brands  
Proportion of high-equity brands among brands with a 2% or 
higher market share for each participating retailer. 
Store-related    
Store type (ST) 
 
Service or price oriented 
store 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the retailer has high scores on 
perceived service elements as quality, friendliness of 
employees, assortment size, etc.  Source: GfK Summer 
Report 2004. 
Number of alternative stores 
(NAS) 
Number of other stores 
available to consumers  
Number of supermarkets in the same zip code area. 
Control Variables   
Promotional buy (PB) Brand is bought on 
promotional  
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the purchased brand was on 
promotion at the moment of purchase. 
Gender (SEX) Gender of respondent Dummy variable, equal to 1 if respondent is female. 
Age (AGE) Age of respondent Four-point scale (1 = 30 years or younger, 4 = 65 years or 
older). 
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